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The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon
Disenfranchisement Laws
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari' to review the
decision of the California Supreme Court in Ramires v. Brown,2
which held the California constitutional and statutory provisions3
disenfranchising ex-felons invalid as violations of the equal protec-
1. Sub nom. Richardson v. Ramires, 94 S. Ct. 45 (1973). The state of California sub-
sequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the same case, California v. Ramires,
42 U.S.L.W. 3125 (U.S. Sept. 11, 1973). The Court has also docketed a district court
decision upholding Washington's ex-felon disenfranchisement law, Dillenburg v. Kramer,
Civil No. 9725 (W.D. Wash. May 22, 1973), appeal docketed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3164 (U.S.
Sept. 17, 1973).
This term the Supreme Court will also hear an appeal from a decision denying
detainees the right to receive absentee ballots. O'Brien v. Skinner, 31 N.Y.2d 317,
291 N.E.2d 134, 338 N.Y.S.2d 890 (1972), prob. juris. noted, 411 U.S. 963 (1973). This
may result in some consideration of the question of felon disenfranchisement. This
Note, however, addresses the question of disenfranchisement of ex-felons, that is, those
felons who have completed their prison sentences. Exclusion of prisoners from the
franchise is apparently regarded as part of the general loss of liberty suffered by
prisoners. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1968) (dicta by Blackmun,
J.); cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Project, Collateral
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 950-51, 977-80 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as VANDERBILT PROJECT]. Disenfranchisement of felons who have been
released from prison but who are still on probation or parole presents problems similar
to disenfranchisement of ex-felons whose sentences have expired completely. Although
a parolee or probationer has certain restrictions placed on his liberty, see note 66
inIra, his situation seems closer to the ex-felon than to the prisoner. See p. 592
infra. The California Supreme Court in Ramires specifically limited its decision to
ex-felons whose terms of incarceration and parole had expired. See 9 Cal. 2d 199, 507
P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973). Most suits challenging the disenfranchisement laws
have been brought by plaintiffs whose prison terms and parole had expired, and
the decisions seem limited to those facts. See, e.g., Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222
(9th Cir. 1972); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd mein., 411
U.S. 961 (1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd mein., 396
U.S. 12 (1969). The relevant inquiry would seem to be whether the loss of liberty
while on parole can include disenfranchisement; cf. Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294,
1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
2. 9 Cal. 3d 199, 507 P.2d 1345, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1973).
3. The California constitution provides that "Laws shall be made to exclude from
office, serving on juries, and from the right of suffrage, persons convicted of bribery,
perjury, forgery, malfeasance in office, or other high crimes." CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 11. A
voter is required to provide an affidavit saying that he is not disqualified by reason
of a felony conviction, but the code states that not all felony convictions cause dis-
qualification. CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 310 (West Supp. 1973). The qualifying clause is
the result of Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966),
in which the state supreme court, in order to find the law constitutional, construed
it as excluding only those ex-felons guilty of offenses which indicated a propensity to
commit election crimes. Application of this rule was left to local authorities. The
result of this delegation was that the offenses for which an ex-felon could be dis-
enfranchised varied greatly from county to county. Some counties rarely disenfran-
chised; others disenfranchised for practically all crimes. Some included narcotic of-
fenses; others did not. Some counties distinguished between rape and statutory rape,
the former causing disenfranchisement and the latter not. See California Secretary of
State, Report Regarding the Right to Vote of Ex-felons, May 30, 1972.
Ramires overruled Otsuka, finding the narrow construction of the law insufficient
to save it, and held it unconstitutional as applied to ex-felons whose sentences and
parole had ended.
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tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While there have been a
number of lower court decisions on this subject, 4 as well as sum-
mary decisions5 and dicta from the Supreme Court, 6 this should
provide the first full Supreine Court consideration of the question.
For the past 80 years the leading case on ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment has been Davis v. Beason,7 which upheld a territorial law ex-
cluding bigamists or members of organizations advocating bigamy."
The only constitutional issue raised in that case, however, was a First
Amendment free exercise of religion question. Furthermore, the
Court relied on arguments which are in direct conflict with modern
equal protection doctrine.9
4. E.g., Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1972); Green v. Board of
Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968); Kronlund v.
Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182(D.N.J. 1970). See also Cody v. United States, 460 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1972); Zwich v.
Freeman, 373 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1967) (deprivation of civil liberties upheld against
several challenges); Morrison v. California, 238 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (challenge to
system of depriving felons of both political and civil rights upheld). Loss of civil rights
presents an analogous situation to disenfranchisement, but there are significant dif-
ferences because of the specially protected position of voting rights. See pp. 588-89 infra.
5. E.g., Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 931 (1973), aff'g mem., 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.
N.C. 1972); Beacham v. Braterman, 396 U.S. 12, aff'g mem., 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
Fla. 1969).
6. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673 (1966)(Black, J., dissenting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1964); Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958);
Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122 n.13 (1946).
These dicta have assumed the constitutionality of ex-felon disenfranchisement with-
out actually considering the constitutional problems involved. Judge Friendly, in Green
v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 104(1968), however, argued that the frequency of references to ex-felon disenfranchisement
by the Supreme Court makes them more than "unconsidered dicta." On the other
hand, the source of all these dicta is the easily discredited case of Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890), see notes 7-9 infra, a fact suggesting that the question of felon
disenfranchisement may still be "unconsidered" for present purposes.
7. 133 U.S. 333 (1890). The Idaho constitutional provision challenged in Davis v.
Beason is still in effect today. IDAHO CONsT. art. 6, § 3. It excludes from the franchise
bigamists, advocates of bigamy, and members of organizations advocating bigamy. No
conviction for violation of laws against bigamy is required to cause disenfranchisement.
Thus as long as the Mormon church advocated bigamy, all of its members were
automatically deprived of the vote whether or not they practiced or advocated bigamy
themselves. The Court did not comment on this, treating the law as one disen-
franchising criminal offenders.
8. The earlier case of Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885), upheld a federal
statute disenfranchising bigamists against the argument that it was an ex post facto law.
9. Justice Field in his final peroration defended the statute as an attempt to "pre-
vent persons from being enabled by their votes to defeat the criminal laws of the
country." 133 U.S. at 348. The Supreme Court has more recently held, however, that
groups of voters may not be "fenced out" because they would vote differently or have
different interests than the majority, Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965). There is no rational difference between
"fencing out" non-property owners from a bond referendum because they might vote
for higher taxes (Cipriano) and excluding Mormons because they might vote to legalize
bigamy. Even more blatantly in conflict with modern voting rights doctrine is the
statement from Murphy v. Ramsey, cited approvingly by Justice Field, that monogamy
is the "best guarantee of that reverent morality which is the source of all beneficient
progress" and that it is therefore proper for a state to "withdraw all political in-
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In recent years the Supreme Court has twice affirmed lower court
rulings upholding e;:-felon disenfranchisement laws.10 It has done so,
however, only in memorandum decisions in cases within its obliga-
tory appellate jurisdiction" with no reasons or authority cited and
the effect of these summary affirmances remains opaque.' 2 Ramires,
therefore, may provide an authoritative ruling on this increasingly
controversial issue.
I
The various state laws on ex-felon disenfranchisement show more
variety than uniformity, and the original legislative purposes are
consequently difficult to divine. Three states (Maine, Arkansas, and
fluence from those who are practically hostile to its attainment." 133 U.S. at 345.
This reflects a casual attitude towards ballot rights which is inconsistent with modern
decisions which treat the right to vote as a "fundamental right" of state citizenship.
See pp. 588-89 infra.
10. Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd wen., 411 U.S. 961
(1973); Beacham v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd mene., 396 U.S. 12
(1969). The constitutional arguments discussed in the lower court opinion in Fincher
v. Scott, supra, are considered in note 46 infra. The scope of the lower court opinion
in Beacham v. Braterman, supra, was much narrower. The opinion stated that felon
disenfranchisement was constitutional but mentioned no specific constitutional arguments
either supporting or challenging that position. The opinion merely cited Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), dicta in other Supreme Court cases, and the Second Cir-
cuit decision in Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1048 (1968). The only issues treated in detail were the equal protection and
due process problems arising from the discretion of the governor under Florida law to
pardon convicted felons. This is certainly not sufficient to foreclose further considera-
tion of the basic issue.
Furthermore, the California statute involved in Ramires is distinguishable from the
North Carolina and Florida statutes involved in Fincher v. Scott and Beacham v. Brater-
man. The California law is unique in that it requires a determination at the local
level that the person excluded has been convicted of an offense which by its nature
indicates that the offender is a threat to the electoral system. See note 3 supra. The
possibilities for arbitrary enforcement and irrational differences among the policies of
local jurisdictions found to exist in Ramires may present constitutional problems which
would not arise in a system enforced differently. See p. 592 infra. Also, the California
courts have explicitly construed the state law to exclude only those who are likely to
abuse the ballot, Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284
(1966). If this determination is accepted, it would rule out any possible justifications
based on punitive purposes which might have been raised in defense of the law.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
12. While summary affirmance is an adjudication on the merits, it does not con-
clusively resolve the issue when other full Supreme Court decisions by strong impli-
cation require a different result; cf. Dillenberg v..Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1972). On the precedential value of summary affirmances, see generally sources
cited United States ex rel. Epton v. Nenna, 318 F. Supp. 899, 906 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
STUDY GROUt ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, REPORT 26 (1972); R. STERN &
E. GRESSMEN, SUPREME COURT PRAcTIcE 195-96 (1962); Currie, The Three Judge District
Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. Cnm. L. REv. 1, 74 n.365 (1964); Frankfurter
& Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 14 (1930); ef. the treatment of a summary affirmance in Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441 (1973). But see United States ex rel. Fein v. Deegan, 410 F.2d 13, 22 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969). Even if a lower court might be bound by a summary
affirmance, it is difficult to see how the Supreme Court would consider itself bound
by a prior affirmance without opinion as it defines the contours of expanding con-
stitutional doctrine.
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Tennessee) have no ex-felon exclusion laws of any sort.' 3 Another ten
states exclude ex-felons from voting until the end of the maximum
possible sentence allowed by law, until the completion of parole or
probation, or during imprisonment.' 4 Three states disenfranchise for
a limited period of time,15 and several states have significantly lib-
eralized the pardon process.'0 Five states disenfranchise only those
convicted of treason, bribery, or election crimes.' 7 Twenty-eight
states disenfranchise virtually all unpardoned ex-felons,' s but those
states apply many different standards for determining what offenses
cause loss of political rights.' 9 California, until Ramires, occupied
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-101 (1947), § 3-707 (Supp. 1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-205
(1972). Both states have recently repealed restrictive statutes. Note, Disenfranchisement
of Ex.Felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 845, 859 n.106 (1973). Maine has no
ex-felon exclusion provisions anywhere in its statutes, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 245 (Supp. 1972) (setting out requirements for voting).
14. CoLo. CONST. art. vii, § 10; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-5 (Smith-Hurd 1973);
IND. ANN. STAT. § 29-4804 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62.2252 (1964); MicH. CONST. art. 2,
§ 12; MicH. CoPir. LAWS ANN. § 168.10; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 23-2701 (1971); N.Y.
ELECTiONS LAw § 152 (McKinney Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 144.320 (1953); W. VA.
CONST. art. IV, § 1; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.03(1), 57.078 (Supp. 1973).
15. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 11.060, 216.355 (1966) (first offenders' rights restored auto-
matically after two years from discharge); PA. CONST. art. VII (1968) (only election law
offenders excluded; exclusion for that election only); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 145 (1968)
(five year exclusion for election crimes).
16. CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-47 to -48 (1963); N.H. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 11. Some
other states allow the courts to restore all political and civil rights, e.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1203.4 (West Supp. 1973). The California procedure is apparently little used,
as the California Supreme Court in Ramires did not even mention it.
17. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § I (Supp. 1972); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 11; PA. CONST.
art. VII; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 145 (1968); UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6. New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:4-1 (Supp. 1972), excludes election law offenders permanently, and
all other criminals during imprisonment or parole only.
18. ALA. CONST. art. 3, § 182; ALA. CODE tit. 17, § 15 (1958); ALASKA CONST. art. 5,
§ 2; ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (1971); ARIZ. CONsT. art. 7, § 2; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-101(5) (Supp. 1972); DEL. CONsT. art. 5, § 2; FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 4; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 97.041 (Supp. 1973); GA. CoNsr. § 2-801; HAWAII CONST. art. 2, § 2; IDAHO CONST. art.
6, § 3; IDAHO CODE § 34-402 (Supp. 1972); IOWA CONT. art. 2, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 145;
LA. CONSr. art. 8, § 6; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.1 (Supp. 1973); MD. CoNsr. art. 1,
§ 2; MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-4(b)(5) (1971); MINN. CONST. art. 7, § 2; MISS. CONST.
art. 12, § 241; Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-5-35 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-112 to -113 (1964);
NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1; N.M. CONsr. art. 7, § 1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-1-4 (1953); N.C.
CoNsr. art. VI, § 2(3); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-55(3) (1972); N.D. CONST. art. 5, § 12.7;
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-01-04 (Supp. 1971); OHIO CONST. art. 5, § 4; OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2961.01-02 (Page 1954); OKLA. CONST. art. 3, § 11; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§ 93.1 (Supp. 1972); R.I. CONST. amend. XXIV; S.C. CONST. art. 2, § 7 (Supp. 1971);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(5)(c) (Supp. 1971); S.D. CONST. art. 7, § 8; S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 12-3-1 (Snpp. 1972); TEx. CONSr. art. 16, § 2; TEx. ELECTION CODE ANN. art. 5.01
(1967); VA. CONsT. art. 2, § 2; VA. CODE ANN. § 24.1-42 (1971); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 29.07.070 (Supp. 1972); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4 (1957). In addition, Missouri perma-
nently excludes all repeating offenders, Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 111.060, 216.355 (1966).
19. Most, but not all, of these states use the general term "felon." Some states ex-
clude instead those convicted of "infamous crimes," e.g., WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 5;
WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29.07.070 (Supp. 1972); R.I. CONST. amend. XXIV; IOWA CONST.
art. 2, § 5, which can be defined as crimes "infamous at common law" (Rhode Island)
or as crimes carrying a penitentiary sentence (Iowa). See VANDERBILT PROJECT, supra
note 1, at 957-59. The penitentiary test is the same as that generally used to define
"felony." Some states have a "serious crime" standard, combined either with the "in-
famous crime" standard, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-4(b)(5) (1971), or with a list
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an intermediate position. The state constitution and statute20 exclud-
ed all those convicted of "high crimes" or "felonies," terms which
were interpreted by the state supreme court to disenfranchise only
those who were convicted of crimes indicating that the offender
would be a threat to the election system. 21
In most states this policy of excluding ex-felons has been almost
unquestioned since the early nineteenth century,2 2 when voting was
regarded as a "privilege" to be exercised only by an elite (white,
male, propertied, and of high moral qualities).2 3 The old Supreme
Court case, Davis v. Beason 2 4 suggests that disenfranchisement is
necessary to prevent criminals from voting for repeal of the criminal
laws.25 Disenfranchisement has often been justified in nebulous terms
as an attempt to "protect the purity of the ballot box" against cor-
ruption.26 It might also be viewed as part of the voter qualification
system, comparable to the exclusion of aliens, children, the insane,27
of specific offenses, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(5)(c) (Supp. 1971). Kentucky bars those
convicted of felonies, bribery in elections, or "high misdemeanors" designated by the
legislature, Ky. CONST. § 145. Some states exclude only those sentenced to state peni-
tentiaries, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-112 to -113 (1964). Many states provide lists of
offenses (generally not exclusive of other crimes), which range from murder, robbery,
and other felonies to such crimes as fornication, bigamy, or encouragement of bigamy,
IDAHO CONsT. art. 6, § 3, incest, miscegenation, sodomy, or vagiancy, AL%. CODe
tit. 17, § 15 (1959), and "any crime involving moral turpitude," AL\SKA CONsr. art. 5,
§ 2; ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (1971). See generally VANDERBILT PROJECT 959-60. Two
southern states (Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-5-35 (1972); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-62(5)(8) (Supp.
1971)), had long disenfranchised those convicted of sexual crimes and crimes against
property, but did not add murder until the 1960's. See generally Ratliff v. Beale, 74
Miss. 247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896).
Many states explicitly include election law violations in addition to felonies or "in-
famous crimes." Most of the states with specific provisions covering the subject deny
the vote to those convicted by the federal government or other states of crimes which
cause loss of rights in the home state, Note, supra note 13, at 857 nn.94-96; Anno., 39
A.L.R.3d 303 (1971), but at least one state, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01-02 (Page
1954), explicitly excludes federal convicts from those who are disenfranchised.
20. CAL. CONsT. art. 20, § 11; CAL. ELECTIONS CODE § 310 (West Supp. 1973). See
note 3 supra.
21. See Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966); note
3 supra.
22. Cf. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1048 (1968). See sources cited note 86 infra.
23. See Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531, 575-90, 596-600, 614-19, 622-29 (1865); S.
MORRISON, H. COMMACER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, THE GROWTH OF THE AMIERIcA,.N REPUBLIC
133, 211-14 (1969).
24. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
25. This has been echoed by Judge Friendly in his assertion that the equal pro-
tection clause could not conceivably require a state to let "convicted mafiosi vote for
district attorneys or judges," Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451-52 (2d
Cir. 1967). See cases cited note 39 infra.
26. Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585, 51 Am. R. 479, 481 (1884). See State ex rel.
Att'y General v. Irby, 190 Ark. 786, 795-96, 81 S.W.2d 419, 423 (1935); Application
of Palmer, 61 A.2d 922, 923 (N.J. County Ct. 1948); sources cited VANDERBILT PROJECT,
supra note 1, at 982 n.298. See also Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.
N.J. 1970).
27. E.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS Ch. 51, § I (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 3-4
(1971). See Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971); ef. cases cited
note 39 infra.
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and, until recently, the illiterate. Another purpose may be to punish
the ex-felon .28 Perhaps the purpose of the laws is a mixture of all
of these. If pressed to defend the existence of the laws today, most
people, perhaps even some legislators, would probably express a
feeling that ex-felons are "unworthy" to be voters, an attitude which
seems to contain equal elements of punishment of the unworthy
and protection of the ballot against the unworthy.29 It may con-
sequently be a futile endeavor to try to isolate any one of these goals
as the sole purpose of ex-felon disenfranchisement laws.
If the purpose of the laws is regulatory and not punitive, there
are certain goals which such regulations may not pursue.30 A state
may not try to secure uniformity of opinion by limiting the fran-
chise to those who share a common interest in the issues being voted
upon.31 A group cannot be excluded because it might vote differently
from the majority, 32 or because it might "take over" the government
or try to control its policy. 33 It is not at all clear that the ex-felon
disenfranchisement laws are free from this flaw. Even the leading
Supreme Court case, Davis v. Beason,34 suggested that the purpose
of such laws was to exclude ex-felons because of the way they might
vote. If this is really the purpose of the laws, they must then fall
within the ban on "fencing out" groups because they might vote
differently or take over the government.
28. See Note, The Equal Protection Clause as a Limitation on the States' Power
to Disenfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 309-10 (1967).
This is a particularly plausible interpretation for state laws which are contained in the
..penal" sections of their codes, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-10-18; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 62.2252 (1964); Oino REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2961.01-.02 (Page 1954). See Singleton v. State,
38 Fla. 297, 302, 21 So. 21, 23 (1896); Elkin v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 6, 8, 106 S.W.2d
83, 84 (1937); In re Coppola, 155 Ohio St. 329, 335-36, 98 N.E.2d 807, 810-11 (1951)
(dicta); In re Moskowitz, 329 Pa. 183, 186, 196 A. 498, 500 (1938); cf. Borino v. General
Registrars, 86 Conn. 622, 86 A. 597 (1913).
29. See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1048 (1968).
30. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (in awarding welfare benefits, a state
has no valid interest in excluding aliens resident within the state); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (in determining qualifications for welfare benefits, it is an
impermissible purpose for a state to seek to keep indigents out of the state or to limit
benefits and services to those who have "contributed" to the state through taxes);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (implication that a state does not have a valid
interest in protecting the integrity of political subdivisions by drawing unequal election
districts); Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (a county may not close its schools
for the purpose of encouraging segregation, because this is an impermissible purpose)..
31. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972). See also Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). The only exception to this rule is for elections in special
districts, established to perform certain limited functions but not exercising any gen-
eral governmental power, Salyer v. Tulare Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973). The Court there emphasized that such districts were exempt from the general
Reynolds rule only because of their limited powers.
32. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 210 (1969).
33. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965).
34. 131 U.S. 333 (1898). See cases cited note 39 infra; Note, supra note 13, at 854.
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The ex-felon exclusion laws may be tainted with this impermissible
purpose even if the stated purpose is to restrict the vote to those who
are "qualified" or "knowledgeable." No state gives potential voters
an objective test of knowledge or competence, 3 5 a fact which suggests
that the asserted goal of determining voter qualifications may be
nothing more than a rationale for excluding those who might vote
differently from the majority.30 When a state excludes children or
the insane, it acts on the principle that such people are incapable
of making a rational political choice because of their physical or
mental condition.37 There is no evidence, however, that ex-felons are
unable to act as rationally as others.38 The state in excluding them
cannot be determining "qualifications" in the sense of knowledge of
civic affairs (unless it is acting completely without a rational basis
for its policy). Instead, there could only have been a determination
that ex-felons are morally unfit to vote by reason of their bad charac-
ter.
The idea of "moral unfitness" to vote can be interpreted in several
different ways. First, it may simply be a restatement of the view
that criminals should be excluded from the political process because
of the way they might vote.3 9 The state might fear that the ex-felon
35. The closest states have ever come to such a test is through literacy tests, which
the Court has held constitutional when not discriminatory, Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S.
45 (1959), but which are now banned in all elections by federal statute, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1973(b), 1973aa(a) (1970), upheld in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
36. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 354-59 (1972).
37. See note 27 supra; cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 242 (1970) (opinion of
Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ.). In determining where the line should be drawn
in excluding children, legislatures must of necessity be given some discretion to make
a rational judgment on when the "age of reason" begins. Obviously a one-year-old
can be excluded because of age; equally obviously, a forty-year-old could not. Any
line is bould to be arbitrary, because some of those deemed too young will be more
intelligent and informed than some of those who are deemed old enough. At the same
time, it would be impossible to devise an objective test of maturity and rationality
for all citizens. The only way, therefore, to exclude the obviously immature is to draw
the line at some specific age, and the courts can only require that there be a rational
basis for the age chosen. In Oregon v. Mitchell, it is possible to read the Douglas
opinion and the joint Brennan, White, and Marshall opinion as applying this sort
of standard to the state twenty-one-year-old voting laws. See also Note, supra note 13,
at 855 n.78 (suggesting that age qualifications can be distinguished because they are
limited in time); cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
38. Of course, to be considered a rational and intelligent voter, the ex-felon need
not make his voting decisions entirely on the basis of a dispassionate evaluation of
the issues and the public interest. It is generally accepted (especially by politicians
campaigning for votes) that most voters act according to (at best) enlightened self-in-
terest. If ordinary voters are allowed to "vote their pocketbooks" or respond to similar
appeals, ex-felon voters should not be held to a higher standard of rationality.
39. Cf. Kronlund v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971); In re Minner,
133 Kan. 789, 3 P.2d 473 (1931); Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 868
(1896); State ex rel. Barret v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 1237, 1241-42, 175 S.W.2d 787, 788
(1943); State ex rel. Olson v. Langer, 65 N.D. 68, 86, 256 N.W. 377, 385 (1934).
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might cast his vote for purposes other citizens consider immoral-
i.e., by voting for public policies with which they disagree.40 Judge
Friendly has suggested 4' that disenfranchisement is the consequence
of the ex-felon permanently placing himself outside the social and po-
litical community by violating its "social contract." This is another
view of the "moral unfitness" notion. An argument on this level of
philosophical abstraction, however, is either circular or at best a
legal conclusion: Ex-felon disenfranchisement is justified because of
the violation of the "social contract" and the existence of the "social
contract" is defined by the criminal laws. Moreover, the legitimacy
of such a philosophical rationale may have been undermined to
some extent by the cases denying a governmental power to with-
draw citizenship without a person's consent. 42
Finally, "moral unfitness" may simply mean that disenfranchise-
ment of ex-felons is a punishment or a regulatory device designed
to prevent future election law violations. If punishment is the prin-
cipal purpose, there may be equal protection issues raised by the
irrational distinctions made in determining which offenses cause
disenfranchisement, 43 but the most serious problems would arise
from other constitutional prohibitions. 44 The difficult equal pro-
tection question arises if the legislative purpose is defined as the
prevention of election crimes, fraud, bribery, or related political
40. If a state is allowed to exclude ex-felons because they are morally unfit, what
other people or groups could be excluded by the same rationale? A state might be able
to require prospective voters to obtain character references from respected members of
the community (since that would seem to be a more accurate way of isolating the
immoral than exclusion of the broad class of ex-felons, many of whom might have
reformed). Cf. Note, supra note 13, at 854. A state might be able to exclude members
of organizations which it has good reason to believe advocate violence for political
purposes (Communists, members of the Ku Klux Klan or the John Birch Society,
Black Panthers). Indeed, Gilbert Green's "moral unfitness" to vote resulted from his
conviction for being a Communist. See Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968). See also Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247,
20 So. 865 (1896) (covert racial discrimination).
It is hard to believe, however, that the courts would permit a disenfranchisement
system with the purpose or the effect of removing a group of political dissenters from
the election process. In fact, Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr.
284 (1966), in which the California Supreme Court drastically restricted the scope of
the state disenfranchisement law, see note 3 supra, was inspired in part by the legal
and political difficulty of using the laws to disenfranchise convicted draft evaders
during the Vietnam War. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
41. Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1048 (1968).
42. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 258 (1967); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93
(1958).
43. Cases such as Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1943), have invalidated dis-
criminations which rested on a completely illogical distinction among offenses. See
note 73 infra.
44. See generally pp. 593-601 infra.
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offenses. 45 The rest of this discussion will focus on the validity under
equal protection doctrine of disenfranchisement for this purpose.4"
II
The California Supreme Court in Ramires correctly relied on the
application of the strict scrutiny standard of review.47 Since Reynolds
v. Sims4s strict scrutiny has been applied to almost every voting
45. This is the purpose which the California court found in Otsuka v. Hite, 64
Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1966), and rejected in Ramires.
46. In Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 961
(1973), the district court held that equal protection does not apply to ex-felon voting
rights because the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a state to deny
the franchise to a person for "participation in rebellion or other crime" without loss
of congressional representation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This is not, however,
a valid justification for refusing to examine ex-felon disenfranchisement under the equal
protection clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment; the fact that a
state risks no specific penalties by excluding ex-felons is not a positive authorization
of the practice if other constitutional provisions are violated by it; cf. Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 589, 594 (1964) (rejection of Justice Harlan's position that § 2 of U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, is the only section which deals with voting). But see Green v.
Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1967). It
would of course be different if the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment di-
rectly permitted states to exclude criminals or explicitly exempted ex-felon disenfranchise-
ment from the other constitutional requirements, but the primary purpose and effect
of that section was to prevent "the readmission of an increased number of southern
representatives elected only by white secessionists .... ." Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth
Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 33, 57. See generally id. at 45-68; cf. Note, supra note 13, at
850-51.
If the penalty section of the Fourteenth Amendment were allowed :to override the
equal protection clause of the first section, then one would have to admit that a state
could exclude anyone it wished (except those specifically enfranchised by U.S. CoNsr.
amends. XV, XIX, XXVI) for any reason, as long as it were willing to have its rep.
resentation reduced. Surely the courts would not let a state disenfranchise, for ex-
ample, 1000 leading opponents of the dominant political party and then say that the
only remedy would be a "proportional" reduction in representation; cf. Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
Even an argument that ex-felon voting could be distinguished on the basis that ex-
felon disenfranchisement would not require reduction of representation would not in-
sulate disenfranchisement from the equal protection clause. The second section of the
Fourteenth Amendment might be read to allow a state to exclude those under 21 years
of age from voting in both federal and state elections ("But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President . . . is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such state, being twenty-one years of age . - ."), yet the Supreme
Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), permitted Congress to use certain of
its powers (its article I power to regulate elections, or its enforcement powers under
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5) to deny the states the right to exclude 18-year-olds from
federal elections. Similarly, the Court, while upholding the states' right to disenfran-
chise those under 21, did not purport to rest its decision on § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rather, it found that the disenfranchisement did not violate § 1, as en-
forced under § 5. See Oregon v. Mitchell, supra at 125-26. The Court thus apparently
allows specific guarantees or grants of powers contained elsewhere in the Constitution
to override any implied permission to disenfranchise citizens which might, be found
in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accord, Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F. Supp. 1182,
1185-87 (D.N.J. 1970); cf. In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973) (rejecting arguments
made in dissent that equal protection does not apply to aliens because other sections
of the Constitution make distinctions between aliens and citizens).
47. 9 Cal. 3d at 206, 507 P.2d at 1349, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
48. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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question reaching the Court.49 It applies, of course, to the post-
Reynolds reapportionment cases. 50 In 1966 it was used to strike down
exclusions for failure to pay poll taxes. 51 In 1968 formation of parties
was declared to be a fundamental right. 52 Two 1969 cases, employing
strict scrutiny, forbade exclusion of nonproperty owners from bond
issue votes53 and exclusion of nonproperty owners and nonparents
from school elections.54 In 1972 strict scrutiny was extended to resi-
dency requirements for voting 5 and to the right to run for office.50
49. See notes 50-57 infra. But cf. McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 803 (1969)
(strict scrutiny was not extended to a statute denying the right to receive absentee
ballots to certain people, including those in prison, because the absentee ballot system
was held to be a progressive reform, allowing piecemeal extension, and not a funda-
mental right). This restriction of strict scrutiny is not relevant here, since actually deny-
ing the right to vote is very different from a denial of benefits of a system designed
to make voting easier and more convenient; cf. Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973)
(suggesting that McDonald does not extend to an outright denial of the right to vote).
McDonald suggests that a voter registration law which made registration easier for
some people but more difficult for felons or ex-felons might be subject only to the
traditional rationality test. Here, however, ex-felons are denied the right to register
and vote under any circumstances or conditions, a situation which does not appear
to come under the McDonald exception. The Supreme Court this term is also review-
ing a New York decision, O'Brien v. Skinner, 31 N.Y.2d 317, 291 N.E.2d 134, 338
N.Y.S.2d 890 (1972), prob. juris. noted, 411 U.S. 963 (1973), which may limit McDonald.
The Court in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), also refused to apply strict
scrutiny to a voting case in its holding that state voting age requirements were valid.
In that case, however, there was no majority or even plurality holding. Four justices
would have applied a strict scrutiny equal protection test, and four others would
have held equal protection either inapplicable in voter qualification cases or satisfied
by a showing that the law made no suspect classifications. The key opinion by Justice
Black rested on the argument that the states have the power to set voter qualifications
except when specifically barred by the Fourteenth Amendment (as with racial exclu-
sions). The objective of excluding children is a permissible state purpose, see Kronlund
v. Honstein, 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971), and the only question is which legis-
lative body will have the authority to engage in the necessary line-drawing. Justice
Black's opinion merely holds that the states retain that power in state elections, while
Congress has the power over congressional elections. None of the opinions in Oregon
v. Mitchell, however, can be read as authorizing state action in the voter qualification
area for an impermissible state purpose.
50. Many of the post-Reynolds reapportionment cases have ordered relief without
any consideration of an equal protection standard, merely citing Reynolds. See, e.g,
Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S.
526 (1969). In such cases one can assume that the basic Reynolds test is still relevant.
Recent cases refusing to extend or apply Reynolds have not challenged the reasoning
in that case, but have held that it did not apply because the exclusionary practices
challenged did not in fact cause any infringement of the right to vote, Salyer v. Tulare
Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971). The Salyer case involved a special election in a water district, and the Court
stressed the difference between this and a general election. Whitcomb was a chal-
lenge to a multi-member election district system. No one was denied the right to
cast a ballot and each vote had an equal weight; neither case suggests that strict
scrutiny does not apply where a state takes away or dilutes the right to vote in an
election for general political officials.
51. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
52. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). The Court held that the right to form
political parties was guaranteed under the First Amendment, which made it a funda-
mental right for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
53. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (bond referendum).
54. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (school district election).
55. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (residence requirements).
56. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (the right to run for political office).
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The state may have different interests in excluding ex-felons than it
has in excluding nonresidents or those with no economic or personal
stake in the election,5 but the right to vote is just as fundamental
to the potential voter in each case. There is no reason, therefore,
for strict scrutiny to stop short of ex-felon disenfranchisement.
If the strict scrutiny standard is applied, the California statute
must almost certainly fall. In the first place, as the Ramires court
argued, enforcement of the election laws is presumably sufficient to
detect and deter whatever election fraud exists.58 (At least no evi-
dence has been put forward which suggests the opposite.) The fact
that the 20 states without full disenfranchisement do not have sig-
nificantly more election fraud suggests that ex-felon exclusion laws
are unnecessary for that purpose.59 Also, a state would have great diffi-
culty proving that all of the ex-felons caught in the sweeping terms
of its statute must be disenfranchised to protect the ballot, when,
for example, excluding only election law offenders might be a less
drastic means of preventing fraud.60
Even if strict scrutiny is not applied to this case, it is very pos-
sible that the California and other state statutes are not even ra-
tionally related to statutory purposes which the "old" equal pro-
tection requires.0 1 For example, there is absolutely no evidence to
either prove or disprove the basic assumption which underlies the
policy of excluding ex-felons to protect the election system: that ex-
felons are more likely than others to violate election laws or other-
wise abuse the ballot. Since election crimes are atypical offenses, there
57. But cf. discussion of cases limiting strict scrutiny, notes 48-50 supra.
58. Ramires v. Brown, 9 Cal. 3d 199, 214, 507 P.2d 1345, 1355, 107 Cal. Rptr. 137,
147 (1973). Accord, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972); cases cited id. at n.24;
cf. Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1972).
59. DuFresne & DuFresne, The Case for Allowing Convicted Mafiosi to Vote for
Judges, 19 DEPAUL L. REV. 112, 126-27 (1969).
60. Excluding election law offenders, under a strict scrutiny test, might be proven
necessary to prevent further crime, in which case it would be permissible if the state
had no less drastic means than that available and if the statute met minimum ra-
tionality standards.
There is a certain lack of clarity in the whole concept of disenfranchisement to
prevent election crimes. Some election crimes (such as vote selling) require the violator
to be a qualified voter, e.g., CAL. ELECrIONS CODE § 12000 (West Supp. 1973). Other
activities which create opportunities for fraud (such as 'poll-watching) may also re-
quire that the person be entitled to vote himself, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 9-235
(1963). In such cases, there is a direct relationship between disenfranchisement and
prevention of crime. Some other crimes, however, such as bribery, e.g., CAL. ELECTIONS
CODE § 12003 (West Supp. 1973), do not require that the offender be a voter. Only in
the former case, where, by denying a potential criminal the instrumentality with
which he can commit a crime, cf. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(d)(1), (g)(1) (h)(1) (1970) (unlawful
for ex-felon to receive or own firearms), the state attempts to prevent recurrence of
crime, would exclusion of election law offenders be permissible.
61. See Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J.
123 (1972).
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is no logical basis for connecting ordinary crimes and election of-
fenses. Most election crimes (multiple voting, tampering with ballots
or voting machinery, bribery)G-0 require a high degree of interest and
involvement in political affaits, and voting studies tend to suggest
that the poor and less educated groups, those groups including, of
course, a disproportionate number of criminals, are more likely to
be politically apathetic. 3 If this is true, then ex-felons might be less
likely to commit election crimes than other people.0 4 Ex-felon dis-
enfranchisement to protect the ballot, therefore, is an irrational clas-
sification which fails to advance the purposes for which it was en-
acted, and it consequently does not satisfy even the most permissive
equal protection standard.0 5
The fact that the class singled out and treated differently consists
of ex-felons does not permit disregard of the rationality rule of the
equal protection clause. Discriminations against convicts and ex-felons
must undergo the same equal protection examination as any other
kind of classification, even when equal protection requirements are
held to be satisfied because of rationality or a compelling state in-
terest.0 6 The Supreme Court has invalidated for lack of rationality
laws denying prisoners sentenced or awaiting trial the protections of
the civil commitment process, 67 and laws allowing the state to enter
judgments against indigent criminal defendants for recovery of de-
fense costs without giving them the protections (such as freedom from
62. E.g., CAL. ELECTIONS CODE §§ 220, 12000-08, 14403, 29130-35, 29430 (West Supp.
1973).
63. A. CAMPBELL, THE AMERICAN VorER 479-81 (1960).
64. It is perhaps too glib an illustration, but it appears that violators of election
laws today are more likely to resemble the "Watergate" participants (or local machine
bosses) in their socioeconomic backgrounds.
65. It would appear that exclusion of those convicted of election crimes, bribery, or
election fraud could perhaps be validly excluded under the equal protection rationality
test. Such people, having once committed such offenses, can be connected with elec-
tion crimes much more directly than ordinary felons, particularly if commission of
the election offense involved an ability to vote; cf. note 60 supra. It may or may not
be true that a person who has committed an election crime is more likely to do so
again than is another person, but the courts would probably not say that it is irra-
tional for a legislature to conclude that he is. This is exactly what the California
Supreme Court held in Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal. Rptr.
284 (1966).
66. There would appear, however, to be an exception to this rule for certain losses
of liberty which are directly connected with the conditions of imprisonment and parole.
See, e.g., Berrigan v. Siegler, 358 F. Supp. 130 (D.D.C. 1973) (a parolee can be denied a
passport without an infringement of First Amendment rights, because the liberty of
a parolee is not unlimited).
67. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), held that prisoners about to be civilly
committed cannot be denied the hearing and trial which others receive, even though
insane persons with criminal propensities may require different treatment. Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), citing Baxstrom, extended this protection to those
awaiting trial. See also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), citing and extending
,Baxstrom.
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garnishment) that other judgment debtors receive.08 The implica-
tion of these cases is that discrimination against the class of ex-
felons must be directly connected with the sentences imposed by the
courts. Such a direct connection between the terms of a sentence
and voting by the ex-felon whose term of imprisonment and parole
has ended seems totally lacking. 9
Within the class of "criminals" itself the equal protection clause
requires the categories to be drawn carefully and rationally, as with
any other kind of legislation. It is not sufficient that a classification
include some offenders and exclude others irrationally. In Skinner
v. Oklahoma70 the Supreme Court invalidated a law allowing sterili-
zation of certain felons because it drew an irrational distinction be-
tween those convicted of "larceny" and those convicted of "embezzle-
ment." The Court has also invalidated laws providing free trial tran-
scripts only for indigent "felons," 7' and laws which in requiring re-
payment of in forma pauperis trial records discriminate irrationally
between those sent to jail and those merely fined.72
If every ex-felon disenfranchisement law were subjected to this
form of analysis, many might be unconstitutional. Certainly a state
which disenfranchises those convicted of theft of a certain object but
not those convicted of theft of another object of equal value violates
the Skinner v. Oklahoma standard .a
68. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972), found no rational basis for denying those
bound to pay back defense costs the protections other judgment debtors receive.
69. If equal protection of the laws is denied the ex-felon who has lesser rights
against judgment creditors, see id., it must certainly be denied to the ex-felon excluded
from the franchise, especially since voting has been held to be a fundamental right
(unlike protection against creditors). The only Supreme Court decision suggesting the
opposite is McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 803 (1969), which held that
prisoners could arbitrarily be denied absentee ballots, but the Court there emphasized
that reform legislation which gave a special privilege to some people would not have
to meet the same equal protection tests as a law interfering with people's rights.
See note 48 supra.
70. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), held that a state cannot provide
free transcripts only for poor "felons" and not poor misdemeanants '(the opinion, how-
ever, focused more on the discrimination between rich and poor persons accused of
misdemeanors).
72. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), held unreasonable a law allowing col-
lection of defense costs from the prison pay of convicts, with no attempts to collect
from those merely fined.
73. Texas, for example, disenfranchises a person for the felony of stealing any
quantity of "wool, mohair or edible meat" but not for the misdemeanors of stealing
larger quantities of, say, cotton or edible vegetables (the theft of which is not auto-
matically a felony). TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1426(c) (1953). See also the odd distinc-
tions in Arizona, California, New Jersey, Mississippi, and Washington law discussed in
Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1225 n.6 (9th Cir. 1972) (e.g., bribing a witness
causes disenfranchisement, but influencing a juror does not); Stephens v. Yeomans, 327 F.
Supp. 1182, 1188 (D.N.J. 1970); Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 605, 414 P.2d 412, 418,
51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 290 (1966); Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266-67, 20 So. 865, 868
(1896); VANDERBILT PROjEcT, supra note 1, at 1173 n.84. See generally id. at 952-66.
Indeed, the arbitriry line between "felons" and "non-felons" seems to have raised as
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III
There may, in addition, be serious "substantive" due process ob-
jections to a regulatory disenfranchisement law. The Court has said
that the due process clause requires that a law interfering with per-
sonal rights be "in the context of the particular circumstances which
gave rise to the legislation, a reasonable means for advancing a legiti-
mate state aim."74 This is almost identical to the "old" equal pro-
tection test, except that it is not a classification which is important,
but the treatment of each individual's rights. This due process test
was used to sustain a law excluding ex-felons from waterfront union
positions, but the Court stressed that "New York was not guessing
or indulging in airy presumptions that convicted felons constituted
a deleterious influence on the waterfront. It was acting on impres-
sive if mortifying evidence .. . ." 5The Court also emphasized the
seriousness of the waterfront situation. Applying this standard to
ex-felon voting laws, there appears to be no such clear and im-
mediate danger from ex-felon activities as there was in that case. The
connection between ex-felon voting and election fraud is not suf-
ficiently direct to meet this rationality test and avoid the charge of
acting on "airy presumptions. '76
The question of legislative presumptions raises another serious
due process question. It is clear that in enacting the ex-felon voting
laws the states must have acted in part on the assumption that ex-
felons were more likely than others to commit violations of the
many equal protection problems in judges' minds as the general equal protection issue
discussed in the text (i.e., whether any class of ex-criminals is unqualified to vote). See
Dillenberg v. Kramer, supra at 1225; Stephens v. Yeomans, supra at 1188; Otsuka v.
Hite, supra at 605; cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446-49 (1973) (White, J., con-
curring).
74. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 157 (1960). Another case decided the same year,
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), seemed to set up a less exacting test for
statutes involving economic or social welfare regulation: "Particularly when we deal
with a withholding of a non-contractual benefit under a social welfare program such
as this, we must recognize that the Due Process Clause can be thought to interpose
a bar only if the statute manifests a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in
rational justification." Id. at 611. The Flemming case involved a United States law
denying Social Security benefits to aliens deported because of their membership in
the Communist Party. The Court in applying its own standard stressed the economic
and fiscal decisions which Congress had to make in determining who was to receive
government benefits and emphasized that the aliens had no right to the benefits they
were denied. The DeVeau standard is clearly more appropriate here, because voting
is a right, not a privilege, and because voting does not involve a "social welfare pro-
gram." See also Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951) (a com-
parable due process claim rejected without enunciating a standard).
75. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 159 (1960).
76. See pp. 590-91 supra. There would appear to be no reason for thinking that
if ex-felon disenfranchisement cannot satisfy equal protection rationality, it can satisfy
due process rationality.
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election laws.rr Even if this assumption were sufficiently justified
to meet the rationality test under the equal protection clause,Ts re-
cent authority suggests that a state is barred by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from making irrebutable presump-
tions about a person's qualities or future behavior. Stanley v. Illinois
in 1972 held that in awarding custody of children a state could not
presume unwed fathers unfit to be guardians of their illegitimate
children without allowing them an opportunity to rebut the pre-
sumption.70 Similarly, in Dunn v. Blumstein8O the Court held that
a state, for the purpose of determining residency for voting, could
not presume that recent arrivals did not intend to become permanent
residents.
There appears to be no reason why the same rule should not ap-
ply to ex-felon disenfranchisement. These cases involve a presumption
as to future conduct or moral character, based on previous behavior."'
In all cases the presumption is irrebutable: The unwed father in
Stanley v. Illinois could not present evidence about abilities or vir-
tues as a guardian; the recently arrived resident could not present
evidence about his intention to remain in the state; the ex-felon
cannot show that he has reformed and is now a virtuous citizen
capable of making an intelligent and informed choice on political
questions.
The prohibition on "conclusive presumptions," while technically
a due process doctrine, appears to be another branch of equal pro-
77. "The presumption is that one rendered infamous by conviction of felony . . .
is unfit to exercise the privilege of suffrage." Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582, 585,
51 Am. R. 479, 481 (1884).
78. No standard has yet been enunciated for determining the rationality of civil
presumptions. The tests set up for criminal presumptions might shed some light on
the question. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), set up a simple rationality
requirement which was interpreted in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), to
mean that the presumption must more likely than not be true in each case. See also
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63
(1965). While the same strict standard should not be applied to civil cases as is applied
to criminal cases (where guilt beyond a reasonable doubt must be shown), it is reason-
able to conclude that civil presumptions should show some degree of rationality, if
not as great as that required in Leary v. United States. If the presumption against
ex-felons is not apparently rational enough to satisfy equal protection or due process
requirements, it should not be sufficient here.
79. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972). See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971) (due process clause bars state from requiring uninsured motorists involved in
accidents to post bonds without hearing on probability of adverse judgment, because
state is assuming their probable liability).
80. 405 U.S. 330, 349-51 (1972); cf. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965).
A conclusive presumption against residency was struck down only last term in Vlandis
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
81. In siring an illegitimate child, plaintiff in Stanley may have violated the state
fornication law. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-81 (Smith-Hurd 1973) (fine or imprison-
ment if fornication is "open and notorious").
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tection doctrine. After all, every legislative classification subject to
equal protection scrutiny involves a "conclusive presumption" as to
some characteristic of the class in relation to the permissible purpose
of the law.8 2 The distinction of "conclusive presumption" doctrine is
its "passive virtue."8' 3 Instead of requiring the invalidation of a clas-
sification because it is not rational in relation to its purpose, the
usual result of successful equal protection challenges, "conclusive pre-
sumption" doctrine only requires that the class members be given
an individual opportunity to rebut the legislature's presumption as
to their characteristics. The availability of this opportunity requires
the legislature to define with precision the specific characteristics to
which disenfranchisement attaches and how a class member may re-
but the classification.8 4 This seemingly successful meld of equal pro-
tection and "procedural" due process 3 thus reduces the scope of ju-
dicial intervention in legislative classifications and at the same time
forces the legislature to reconsider the bases of its presumption as
to the characteristics of the class under scrutiny. This approach to
82. See generally Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REv. 341 (1949). As was stated in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412,
415 (1920), a legislative classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon sonic ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." The
"conclusive presumption" in all equal protection litigation is that members of the legis-
latively determined class are all "similarly circumstanced" in relation to the purpose
of the law. The gist of the normal equal protection complaint thus is that the legis-
latively determined class is imprecise, i.e., "under-inclusive" or "over-inclusive," and,
therefore, the legislative presumption that individuals are "similarly circumstanced" is
not correct.
Generally courts will defer to the legislative judgment on this issue and that is
known today as "old" equal protection, see Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949); note 61 supra. In some areas the Court has been unwilling to defer
to the legislative judgment that some people fall into a particular class, i.e., the Court
finds there are "more precise tests" to separate those covered by the purpose of the
law and those who are not. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 349 (1972), citing Car-
rington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95 (1965). To be sure, certain "substantive right" notions
have been imported into equal protection law, thus defining certain "impermissible"
legislative purposes and by-passing in large part the isste of the precision of the classi-
fication. See generally Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substan-
tive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 39, 57.
83. The phrase is Professor Bickel's. See Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HAv. L. REv. 40 (1961); cf. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. R~v. 1 (1957). See also United States v. Interna-
tional Union, UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 590-93 (1957).
84. This was the mandate in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-54 (1973). See
note 87 infra. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (ordering a hearing to
replace conclusive presumption); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 543 (1971) (ordering com-
pliance with hearing requirement by any means the state chooses). It has been argued
that the "conclusive presumption" doctrine remedy-individual determination of status
in relation to a legislative purpose-is impractical in the ex-felon disenfranchisement
situation. See Note, supra note 13, at 855, citing Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 615-16,
414 P.2d 412, 425-26, 51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 297-98 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting).
85. Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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the problem of ex-felon disenfranchisement may be particularly use-
ful since disenfranchisement, as with other disabilities attaching to
ex-felons, had its "origin in the fogs and fictions of feudal jurispru-
dence and doubtlessly has been brought forward into modern statutes
without fully realizing either the effect of its literal significance or
the extent of its infringement upon the spirit of our system of gov-
ernment.s The Supreme Court in upholding Ramires on this
ground would be less engaged in definitive decisionmaking than in
"remanding" the issue to state legislatures for a modern reconsidera-
tion of what ex-felon disenfranchisement is designed to accomplish
and how that end can be more efficiently and fairly effectuated.87
To be sure, the core equal protection problem would remain but it
possibly would never be reached.
In fact, it is very possible that the due process clause prevents a
state from taking away the right to vote solely by legislative and
administrative action, without an opportunity for a hearing.8" The
right to a hearing has in recent years been extended to many dif-
ferent kinds of criminal and civil proceedings, often involving a po-
tential loss of rights which is far less serious than disenfranchise-
86. Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 731, 139 P. 948, 949 (1914). See Dillenberg
v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972); Stephens v. Yeoman, 327 F. Supp.
1182, 1187-88 (D.N.J. 1970); Anderson v. Baker, 23 Md. 531 (1865); PRESIDENI's CO.t N
o\ LAW ENFORCEMENT AND "IHE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: COR-
RwriONS 88 (1967); Note, supra note 13, at 852-53 n.62. See generally VANDERBILT PROJECI,
supra note 1, at 941-52.
87. Cf. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452-54 (1973). As discussed at pp. 584-85
supra, the purpose of modern disenfranchisement laws is virtually impossible to de-
termine. The reconsideration facilitated by use of conclusive presumption doctrine would
enable a legislature to authoritatively determine the purpose of ex-felon disenfran-
chisement in light of modern equal protection case law on "impermissible" purposes.
See p. 585 supra. It also would give the legislature an opportunity to explore
"reasonable alternative means," Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973), for ascer-
taining which persons should be found incompetent to vote in light of the determined
purpose. Finally, legislative reconsideration should include re-examination of which
criminals should be classified as a threat to the electoral system. See note 73 supra;
cf. Vlandis v. Kline, supra at 456-59 (White, J., concurring).
88. The subjects to be taken up at a hearing might %ary from state to state de-
pending on the reasons for disenfranchisement. Where all who are convicted of certain
enumerated offenses are disenfranchised, the only issue at a hearing might be the
validity of the conviction, with the original judicial finding of guilt binding on civil
proceedings. On the other hand, in a state like California which takes away the
right to vote only for crimes indicating that the offender would be a threat to the
election system, the whole question of moral fitness or the propensity to commit election
crimes might have to be raised at such a hearing.
Some states, see note 16 supra, have liberalized the pardon process by giving the
courts or administrative boards the power to hear appeals for the return of civil and
political rights. This might satisfy the hearing requirements, but only if the court
or board must hold hearings on all petitions instead of acting on its discretion, only
if it considers all issues involved in disenfranchisement at the hearing, and only if
the other procedural requirements for a fair hearing are met; cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 401
U.S. 496 (1972); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). See generally VANDERBILT PROJECT,
supra note 1, at 1197-1208.
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ment."' If disenfranchisement is regarded as punitive,00 the cases
requiring hearings before revoking parole would seem to be con-
trolling.9u Disenfranchisement as a punishment follows conviction in
court, but it is not part of the original judge-imposed sentence 2
It is instead an administratively imposed sanction (like parole revo-
cation) which follows imprisonment and may be based on different
considerations than the original sentence. 3 As long as different stand-
ards are involved or an additional determination of fact is required
in disenfranchisement, it cannot be regarded as part of a "mandatory
sentence" automatically attached to conviction by a court.9 4
If the purpose of the laws is regulatory, not punitive, the need
for a hearing is even greater. Since a sentencing court is concerned
only with applying the criminal law, it could not be argued that the
defendant had a hearing on disenfranchisement through the original
trial 5 Hearings are now required before deprivation of a wide
range of rights or benefits.9 6 There is no logical reason for requiring
a hearing before cutting off a person's welfare payments or denying
him admission to the bar, but not before removing his voting rights. 7
89. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (hearings required for suspension of
probation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (hearings required for parole re-
vocation); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 654 (1972) (unwed father cannot be denied
cus.tody of his children without a hearing on fitness); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (hearing required before welfare benefits are cut off); Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (no garnishment of wages may be ordered without
hearings); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (hearings in juvenile courts must be con-
ducted in accord with all constitutional due process guarantees); Willner v. Committee
on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963) (a person cannot be denied admission to
the bar without a hearing).
90. See p. 585 supra.
91. Note, supra note 13, at 860-61.
92. If it were part of the original sentence, like a jail term or fine, the offender
might be able to urge the judge to reconsider it or appeal it as improperly handed
down. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32, 35. In a practical sense, therefore, disenfranchise-
ment procedures cannot be regarded as a kind of continuing enforcement of the
original sentence. See note 94 infra.
93. In California there must be an administrative finding that the offender is a
likely threat to the election process. Otsuka v. Hite, 64 Cal. 2d 596, 414 P.2d 412, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (1966); see note 3 supra.
94. It may be unconstitutional to impose disenfranchisement as a "mandatory sen-
tence" in any event when the defendant does not have notice that it is part of the
punishment he could receive; cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Cole v. Ar-
kansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286,
296 n.39 (1972). But cf. Franklin v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 737, 224 SAV. 299 (1922)
(disenfranchisement permissible as mandatory sentence if included in the final judgment);
In re Moskowitz, 329 Pa. 183, 196 A. 498 (1938). See also State v. Jones, 82 N.C. 685
(1880).
95. See Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948);
cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
96. See note 89 supra.
97. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Willner v. Committee on Character &
Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
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IV
If disenfranchisement is imposed as a punishment (as distinguished
from a regulatory measure), it may by its very nature be forbidden
by the Eighth Amendment." A punishment need not involve death
or torture to be cruel and unusual.99 The Supreme Court in Trop
v. Dulles'00 held the deprivation of citizenship to be an unconstitu-
tional punishment, calling it a more "primitive" punishment than tor-
ture.101
While the Court emphasized the horrors of statelessness that the
offender could suffer, the basic holding that deprivation of citizenship
was cruel and unusual punishment is especially relevant to ex-felon
disenfranchisement. Voting is in some sense the unique right of citi-
zenship. Only citizens may vote, and only limited classes of citizens
may be denied that right. Voting is not only a right "preservative
of other basic civil and political rights,"'102 but is also the ultimate
act of citizenship, the one act which is both a symbol and a tangible
demonstration of the citizen's full membership in the national com-
munity. 0 3 When a state denies someone the right to vote, he can
hardly be said to remain a full citizen. 0 4 He possesses a few impor-
98. Judge Friendly in Green v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968), held that ex-felon disenfranchisement presented no
Eighth Amendment problems. This holding rested on two grounds: that loss of per-
sonal rights is not punitive and that it would not have been considered cruel and
unusual in the eighteenth century. The first argument is inconsistent with Cummings
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333
(1866). The second argument seems inconsistent with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
99. "[I]t must have come to them [the framers of the Constitution] that there
could be exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which inflicted bodily pain or
mutilation." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 372 (1910); cf. Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See generally VANDERBiLT
PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1195-98; Note, supra note 13, at 858-60.
100. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
101. Id. at 101.
102. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). Reynolds and other voting cases,
e.g., United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), make it clear that the right to vote,
whether regarded as a national right or a right derived from the states, is strongly
protected by the Constitution.
103. But representative government is in essence self-government through the medium
of elected representatives of the people, and each and every citizen has an inalienable
right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his state's legis-
lative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters
through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation
by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an
equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
104. Dictum in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958), implies a distinction
between citizenship and voting by using ex-felon disenfranchisement as an illustration
of a valid exercise of state power, as contrasted with deprivation of citizenship. This
is only dictum, however, and the only authority cited are the no longer acceptable
cases of Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1898), and Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15
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tant rights,10 but the most significant aspect of his citizenship is
gone and he is left only with the title of "citizen," now of com-
paratively slight value. A disenfranchised citizen more closely re-
sembles a resident alien, protected by the Constitution but excluded
from full participation in democratic political life. It follows from
this that loss of voting rights should be treated as virtually equiva-
lent to loss of citizenship, and it has been held that no one may
be deprived of his citizenship against his will. 10 6 The right to vote,
therefore, may be too sacrosanct to be infringed by laws seeking
to prevent election fraud.
Even if the general policy of ex-felon disenfranchisement were up-
held against this line of attack, there may be problems arising from
the way certain states determine what offenses cause loss of rights.
The Court has said that a punishment may be cruel and unusual if it
is excessive or disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. 10 7 In
(1885); see note 9 supra. On the other hand, the Court in Trop cites a dialogue in
the congressional debates in which an immigration official conceded that there was
only a "technical difference" between a felon's loss of the "rights" of citizenship and
the loss of citizenship itself. 356 U.S. at 89 n.4. Moreover, it appears that sometimes
a state views disenfranchisement as part of a loss of citizenship rights. See, e.g., N.Y.
ELECtoNS CODE § 152 (McKinney Supp. 1972). This would be particularly trite where
ex-felon disenfranchisement is connected with so-called "civil death" statutes. See VAN-
DLREILT PRoJ.Ci, supra note 1, at 942-52; cf. p. 587 supra. If all rights of citi-
zenship are lost, however, in what sense does the offender remain a citizen? A New
York Attorney General's opinion at one time held that a felon actually did lose his
citizenship, but this was later reversed, 1925 Op. Arr'y GEN. 135, rev'd, 1943 O'. A-'¥
GEN. 218.
Apparently "citizenship-like" challenges failed in the two instances in which they
were asserted, see Ray v. Pennsylvania, 263 F. Supp. 630 (W.D. Pa. 1967); People v.
Stephano, 64 IIl. 2d 389, 212 N.E.2d 357 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 989 (1966). See
VANDERBILT PROJEcr, supra note 1, at 1174-75, for a criticism of those decisions. See also
DuFresne & DuFresne, supra note 59, at 119-20, 130-31.
105. A citizen has the right to protection by the United States government when
he is abroad and cannot be deported for any reason; ef. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44, 64-65 (1958). With the application of the suspect classification to resident aliens
in equal protection cases, however, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), there
are practically no cases where important government rights, protections, or benefits
can be denied to aliens. This means that more and more, an alien while in this
country can do everything a citizen may except vote.
106. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 258 (1967) ("[W]e hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment was designed to, and does protect every citizen of this Nation
against a congressional forcible destruction of his citizenship, whatever his creed, color,
or race. Our holding does not more than give to this citizen that which is his own,
a constitutional right to remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily re-
linquishes that citizenship."); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958) ("As long as a
person does not voluntarily renounce or abandon his citizenship . . . his fundamental
right of citizenship is secure.").
107. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
365 (1910). This does not mean that sentences have to be uniform or anything close
to it, Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126 (1903), but extreme disparity or excessiveness
is not permitted; cf. note 19 supra; Note, supra note 13, at 860-63 (suggesting that
disenfranchisement is an "unreasonable" punishment under standards for parole and
probation conditions, citing Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1971);
Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749, 750 (N.D. Cal. 1970)).
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Weems v. United States, s08 for example, the Court gave consideration
to the fact that the heavy list of punishments was inflicted for the rel-
atively "minor" offense of falsification of a single public document.
Some states, however, impose disenfranchisement for even less heinous
offenses, such as petty larceny of certain specified objects or private
sexual offenses. 109 The fact that disenfranchisement as a punishment
is not proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, but is instead
imposed on an "all or nothing" basis, might also raise problems." 0
A carefully drawn statute which disenfranchised only for offenses
which were clearly "serious" in nature, made no irrational distinc-
tions among offenses, and was not overly broad in defining its cat-
egories would be acceptable under this narrower Eighth Amendment
standard. The statutes involved in the current disenfranchisement
cases do not appear to be of this quality.'"'
Conclusion
The constitutional challenge to ex-felon disenfranchisement will
force courts to reconsider an ancient practice in light of modern no-
tions of individual rights and social welfare. As Judge Hufstedler
noted," 2 such notions do change as the nature of society and one's
view of the proper role of citizens therein change. Equal protection
doctrine today reflects the uniquely important position voting has
108. 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910)P
109. See note 19 supra.
110. Cf. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. at 365. ("In a sense the law in con-
troversy seems to be independent of degrees. One may be an offender against it,
though he gain nothing and injure nobody. It has, however, some human indulgence-
it is not exactly Draconian in uniformity. Though it starts with a severe penalty, be-
tween that and the maximum penalty it yields something to extenuating circum-
stances.") The "all or nothing" disenfranchisement system appears to lack even the in-
adequate amount of concession to "extenuating circumstances" found in the Weems
statute.
111. There may also be a possible analogy to the interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment given in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). That case held that
it was unconstitutional to punish a person for his "status" when he no longer has
the ability to escape that status. (In the Robinson case, the law made it a crime to
be a drug addict.) But cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (public drunkenness
is not a "status").
The status of being a drug addict and the status of being an ex-felon are essen-
tially similar. Both arise from an illegal act but thereafter are beyond the individual's
control (in fact, a felon has less opportunity to escape his status by his own efforts-
excluding the pardon possibility-than the addict). The major difference is that dis-
enfranchisement is directly connected with the past conviction for a specific offense,
and might be viewed as continuing punishment of that offense, rather than of the
continuing status.
112. Dillenberg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972).
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assumed in recent years. It also reflects a reevaluation of the so-
cietal view of the "criminal" as a social outcast. These develop-
ments coalesce in the issue of ex-felon disenfranchisement.
Courts confronting these challenges would be wise not to view their
role as antagonistic to that of the legislature or, indeed, the citizenry
at large. Rather, they should help to begin the process of reevaluation
by striking down the present California and Washington disenfran-
chisement laws. In the aftermath of such a decision state legislatures
and their constituencies may be able to reformulate the scope of such
laws in a manner consistent with modern views of democracy.
